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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE and BEVERLY COTTLE dba 
B&B PLAZA INC., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
LEGRAND JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., Civil No. 86-0402 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF CACHE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE 
VENOY CHRISTOFFERSEN PRESIDING 
STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION 
Contrary to Rules 9 and 24, Rules of the Supreme Court, 
appellants have failed to state the proper jurisdictional basis 
for this appeal either in their docketing statement or in their 
brief. Dismissal of the appeal is warranted for this reason 
based on Gregory v. Fourthwest Investments Ltd., 735 P.2d 33 
(Utah 1987) . 
Further, respondent contends that this appeal should be 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because appellants did not 
timely file notice of appeal. The grounds for this contention 
are stated in Point I of the Argument. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
The following issues are presented by this appeal: 
1. Whether the jurisdiction of this Court has been 
properly established. 
2. Whether the District Court properly rules that 
appellants' claim is barred by Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725, the 
statute of repose for actions arising from the sale of goods. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUES 
The interplay of two statutes of repose and one statute of 
limitation are determinative of this appeal on the merits. 
Respondent contends that Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2--725 bars this 
action: 
(1) An action for breach of any contract for 
sale must be commenced within four years after the 
cause of action has accrued. By original agreement 
the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not 
less than one year but may not extend it. 
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach 
occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of 
knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs 
when tender of delivery is made, except that where a 
warranty explicitly extends to future performance of 
the goods and discovery of the breach must await the 
time of such performance the cause of action accrues 
when the breach is or should have been discovered. 
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Respondent further contends that appellants' claim is barred by 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 which requires the following actions 
to be brought within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation or 
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; 
also upon an open account for goods, wares and 
merchandise, and for any article charged in a store 
account; also on an open account for work, labor or 
services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, 
that action in all of the foregoing cases may be 
commenced at any time within four years after the last 
charge is made or the last payment is received. 
(2) An action for relief no; otherwise provided 
for by law. 
Appellants assert that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 allows 
their claim to proceed despite the two foregoing statutes: 
No action to recover damages for any injury to 
property, real or personal, or for any injury to the 
person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, 
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of 
an improvement to real property, nor any action for 
damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be 
brought against any person performing or furnishing 
the design, planning, supervision of construction or 
construction of such improvement to real property more 
than seven years after the completion of construction. 
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual, 
corporation, partnership, or any other legal 
entity. 
(2) Completion of construction for the pur-
pose of this act shall mean the date of issuance 
of a certificate of substantial completion by the 
owner, architect, engineer, or other agents, or 
the date of the owner's use or possession of the 
improvement on real property. 
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This provision shall not be construed as extend-
ing or limiting the periods otherwise prescribed by 
the laws of this state for the bringing of any action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Cottles brought suit against LeGrand Johnson for 
damages allegedly arising out of defective cement sold to the 
Cottles by LeGrand Johnson. The cement was sold to the Cottles 
in 1978. In the Spring of 1979 the cement began to crack and 
split. The Cottles filed their Complaint in November, 1985. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On May 1, 1986, LeGrand Johnson moved to dismiss the 
Complaint based on Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725 because the 
action was not taken within four years from the date of sale of 
the cement. The motion was fully briefed and submitted without 
oral argument. On June 2, 1986, District Judge Christoffersen 
issued a memorandum decision granting LeGrand Johnson's Motion 
to Dismiss. Decision attached as Addendum A. 
On June 16, 1986, a Judgment and Dismissal with Prejudice 
was signed and filed with the clerk. On June 18, 1986, LeGrand 
Johnson filed Notice of Entry of Judgment notifying the 
Cottles' counsel that judgment had been entered on June 16, 
1986. 
On July 21, 1986, the Cottles filed notice of appeal. On 
July 31, 1986, LeGrand Johnson moved this court to dismiss the 
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appeal for lack of jurisdiction. On August 18, 1986, the 
Cottles obtained an ex parte extension of time to file notice 
of appeal from District Judge Christoffersen. On September 29, 
1986, this Court granted the Motion to Dismiss because the 
notice of appeal was not timely filed and the ex parte 
extension of time was ineffective. 
On October 13, 1986, the Cottles moved for reconsideration 
of the dismissal of appeal and this Court then remanded the case 
for a hearing on whether an extension of the time should be 
allowed. District Judge Christoffersen held such a hearing on 
December 8, 1986 and issued a memorandum decision on January 12, 
1987 finding that the extension of time was appropriate. 
Statement of Facts 
Jurisdiction. The dates which are pertinent to whether the 
Cottles have timely perfected their appeal are set forth in the 
Course of Proceedings. There is no dispute that the notice of 
appeal was not filed within 30 days after the date of entry of 
judgment. There is also no dispute that Notice of Entry of 
Judgment was mailed to the office of appellants' counsel on 
June 18, 1986. Notice attached as Addendum B. 
The basis for the District Court's finding of excusable 
neglect is the Affidavit of John T. Caine, attached as Addendum 
C. In that affidavit Mr. Caine denies receiving the Notice of 
Entry of Judgment. He admits, however, that he contacted the 
district court clerk's office in late June, 1986 to determine 
when the judgment had been entered. He was advised by the 
clerk that "the Notice of Entry of Judgment was dated June 19, 
1986." Without learning when the judgment rather than the 
notice of judgment had been filed, Mr. Caine assumed that he 
had 30 days from June 19, 1986 in which to file notice of 
appeal. 
Merits. The Cottles' Complaint alleged that they 
"contracted with the defendant for the purchase of concrete 
which was to be poured at plaintiffs' business establishment 
. ..." Complaint, 1f 2. The Complaint alleged that an 
employee of defendant "promised that a guaranty or warranty 
concerning the cement would be provided." Complaint, 1f 3. The 
Cottles claimed that: "The cement utilized for the construction 
was substandard and was not strong enough for the purpose 
required, that is, for storage sheds that would house both 
vehicles and other heavy equipment." Complaint, 1f 4. The 
Cottles further claimed that: "Beginning in the Spring of 1979, 
the cement began to crack and split and subsequent to that 
time, the plaintiffs' use of the property had been limited and, 
in some cases, impossible because of the defective cement.1' 
Complaint, 1f 5. Finally, the Cottles allege that: "The cement 
was defective in its design." Complaint, 1f 6. 
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In support of its motion to dismiss, LeGrand Johnson 
submitted the Affidavit of Larry Jardine which established that 
the Cottles had submitted an order for concrete, that LeGrand 
Johnson had prepared the concrete and delivered it to the 
Cottles1 construction site and poured it into forms which had 
already been constructed at the site. Affidavit of Larry 
Jardine, 1f1f 3, 4. Mr. Jardine further testified that LeGrand 
Johnson did not design the concrete. Affidavit of Larry 
Jardine, 1f 6. 
In response to LeGrand Johnson's motion, the Cottles 
submitted the Affidavit of Billie J. Cottle which established 
that the order for concrete was actually placed by the Cottles' 
general contractor. Affidavit of Billie J. Cottle, 1f 1A. Mr. 
Cottle further alleged that "all decisions concerning the mix 
of the concrete and how it was poured were made exclusively by 
the defendant . . . ." Affidavit of Billie J. Cottle, 1f 1C. 
The sale of concrete took place some time in 1978. The 
Cottles first became aware of deficiencies in the Spring of 
1979. Complaint, 1f 5. 
Despite appellants' inference, there is no evidence that 
LeGrand Johnson designed the concrete or in any sense 
constructed the structures into which it was poured. The 
Cottles allege in their brief that: "The defendant poured the 
concrete, it provided the forms, it formed the floor and walls 
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of the storage units and in fact, handled all the construc-
tion." Brief of Appellants, p. 5. With the exception of 
pouring the concrete, this statement is completely unsupported 
by the record and in fact directly contradicts the Affidavit by 
Billie J. Cottle which indicates that a third party, Skip 
Duffin, was used to set the forms. Affidavit of Billie J. 
Cottle, 1[ IB. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH JURISDIC-
TION IN THIS COURT. 
Appellants should not have been granted an extension of 
time in which to file notice of the appeal. Rule 4(e), Rules 
of the Supreme Court of Utah, only allows such an extension 
upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. The failure 
of plaintiffs' counsel to properly determine the date of entry 
of judgment should not be considered as excusable neglect. 
The advisory committee notes to Rule 4(e) explain the 
exceptional circumstances which must be shown before an 
extension should be permitted: 
Excusable neglect for good cause under this paragraph 
refers generally to an extraordinary circumstance that 
prevented the movant from filing a timely notice of 
appeal and not to inadvertence or oversight on the 
part of counsel or the failure of the client to 
authorize an appeal. 
-8-
Advisory Committee Notes p. 179, Utah Code Annotated, attached 
as Addendum D. Here, counsel's misunderstanding with the clerk 
about when the judgment was filed is no more than simple 
inadvertence. There is nothing unusual or extraordinary about 
it. In Galanis v. Moyes, 16 Utah 2d 181, 397 P.2d 988 (1965), 
this Court ruled that counsel's neglect in failing to check the 
docket was not excusable neglect sufficient to justify a late 
notice of appeal. Similarly here, counsel for appellants 
simply did not check for the correct document in the clerk's 
file. Under these circumstances, respondent submits that 
District Judge Christoffersen erred in granting an extension of 
time in which to file the notice of appeal. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 70A-2-725 BARS THIS ACTION. 
Despite the Cottles' efforts to make this case something 
different, it is no more than a claim that the concrete sold by 
defendant was inadequate. Utah's version of the Uniform 
Commercial Code requires that such an action be commenced 
within four years after the delivery of the goods. Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-2-725 (1965). The statute is plainly applicable to 
any warranty of fitness for a particular purpose as well. 
Here, the Cottles did not file their action until seven years 
after the sale of the cement. The action is untimely and was 
correctly dismissed. 
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This Court elaborated on the proper scope of § 70A-2-725 in 
Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Company, 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 
1984). There, the plaintiff was a subcontractor who had 
purchased doors from the defendant wholesaler. The wholesaler 
shipped the doors to the job site where they were installed by 
the subcontractor. The trial court dismissed the wholesaler as 
a matter of law based on § 70A-2-725. 
On appeal, the subcontractor contended that the six year 
period for actions upon a written contract should have been 
applied instead. This contention was rejected with the 
following language: 
[T]he trial court was correct in rejecting the 
application of this general statute of limitations. 
When two statutory provisions appear to conflict, the 
more specific provision will govern over the more 
general provision. Thus, where the Uniform Commercial 
Code sets forth a limitation period for a specific 
type of action, this limitation controls over an 
older, more general statute of limitation. That rule 
establishes § 70A-2-725 as the applicable statute of 
limitations for the cause of action alleged in this 
case. 
Id. at 216 (citations omitted). Perry confirms that the UCC 
statute was correctly applied here. As here, the plaintiff in 
Perry attempted to avoid the statute by suggesting that its 
action was a claim for indemnity rather than a claim for a 
breach of warranty. This Court rejected that attempt and 
applied the UCC statute because the claim concerned the sale of 
goods. This Court stated: 
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The absolute language of § 70A-2-725, including the 
provision that an action accrues at the time of tender 
delivery regardless of whether an aggrieved party 
knows of the breach, indicates a legislative intent 
that all actions based on breach of contract for the 
sale of goods be brought, if at all, within four years 
of the tender of delivery. This interpretation is 
further supported by the statutory provision 
prohibiting the parties from extending the limitation 
period by agreement. The statute was apparently 
intended to afford ultimate repose in transactions for 
the sale of goods. 
Id. at 219. 
The fact that LeGrand Johnson sold the cement for use at a 
construction site does not change the nature of this claim or 
the length of time in which to bring suit. In W.R.H., Inc. v. 
Economy Builders' Supply, 633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981), the 
purchaser of plywood siding brought an action against the 
seller of the siding for damages which resulted when the siding 
delaminated. A representative of the seller had told the buyer 
that it was "lifetime siding." _Id. at 43. The trial court 
granted summary judgment for the seller based on § 70A-2-725. 
This Court reversed because it found genuine issues of fact 
concerning whether the seller was liable in negligence. Unlike 
the present case, that action had been filed within four years 
from when the product began to deteriorate. To the extent the 
present action sounds in negligence, it is barred by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-12-25 (1953) . 
However, this Court went on to indicate that dismissal of 
plaintiff's contract claim was appropriate under § 70A-2-725. 
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Id, at 46. Unless warranties of future performance had been 
given this Court stated that "the limitation period has clearly 
run." Ld. at 46. The supplier of cement here should be 
treated no differently than the supplier of plywood siding in 
W.R.H. Inc. 
Other jurisdictions have also applied the UCC statute of 
repose in construction cases. In R,W. Murray Company v. 
Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983), the UCC 
statute was applied to a claim against the supplier of aluminum 
framing for a large office building, even though the supplier 
had provided technical advice and drawings relating to the 
design of aluminum framing. In Sawyer v. Camp Dudley, 38 UCCRS 
1287 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1984), the UCC statute was applied to a 
claim against a supplier of sand and gravel who was to screen 
and deliver a certain amount of sand and gravel of specified 
sizes. 
The District Court properly refused to apply Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-25.5. It concerns actions "arising out of the defec-
tive and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property or 
actions against persons performing or furnishing the design, 
planning, supervision of construction, or construction of such 
improvement to real property." Such actions cannot be taken 
more than seven years after the completion of construction. 
Yet, the statute does not allow the Cottles more than four 
years after discovery of a defect in the cement; to take action. 
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Section 78-12-25.5 is a statute of repose, not a statute of 
limitation. It cuts off all actions against those involved in 
construction seven years after the date of substantial comple-
tion. It is not exclusive of other statutes which are 
applicable and run from the sale of goods or the date of dis-
covery of the injury. Indeed, Section 78-12-25.5 specifically 
states in its last paragraph that: "This provision shall not be 
construed as extending or limiting the periods otherwise 
prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any 
action." Here, the laws of Utah prescribe that an action based 
on the sale of goods shall be taken within four years of 
delivery. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725. An action based on 
negligence shall be taken within four years within the date of 
injury. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. Those periods of lim-
itation bar this action in its entirety notwithstanding the 
statute of repose for actions against those involved in 
construction. 
In sum, the District Court correctly characterized the 
Cottles' claim as an action arising out of the sale of goods 
and properly applied the UCC statute of repose to bar the 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, respondent submits that this Court 
should decline to assert jurisdiction over this matter. If the 
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Court finds that it has jurisdiction, then District Judge 
Christoffersen's dismissal of appellants' Complaint based on 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-725 should be affirmed. 
DATED this ^ day of October, 1987. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
HEta f^fiondkjr. Berry 
John^f Lund 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, four 
true and correct copies of Brief of Respondent to counsel for 
appellants, John T. Caine, Richards, Caine & Allen, 2568 






IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE and BEVERLY COTTLE, 
dba B & B PLAZE, INC., 
Plaitniffs 




Civil No. 24518 
Plaintiffs have sued the defendants in their complaint alleging 
their general contractor contracted with the defendant for the 
purchase of cement to be used in the construction by the general 
contractor of their place of business. 
Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds the 
action is barred by the statute of limitations relating to goods 
sold. The allegations of the plaintiffs is that the goods sold 
were substandard and not strong enough for the purpose supplied. 
The defendants allege this is barred by Sec. 78-2-725 U.C.A. a 
four year statute on warranty in a contract for sale of goods. The 
plaintiffs alleging in their complaint, an agent of defendant 
promised a guarantee and warranty concerning the cement to be 
provided. 
The plaintiffs contention is ±hat -the complaint is governed 
by a different statute, Sec. 78-12-25.5 U.C.A. concerning action 
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement 
ADDENDUM A 
to real property or actions against persons performing or 
furnishing the design, supervision of construction, or construction 
of such imporveraent to real property, which is a seven year statute. 
Plaintiffs didn't file their action until seven years after 
the sale of the cement. It wasn't really cement but concrete 
they sold and delivered to the site. 
But, the Court holds this still is goods furnished under the 
four year statute of limitations. Defendant simply provided the 
goods ordered by the general contractor. 
Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss will be granted. Counsel 
for defendant to prepare the appropriate order. 
Dated this J <N & day of June/ 19 86. 
TabB 
RAYMOND M. BERRY 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE and BEVERLY COTTLE, 
dba B & B PLAZA, INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEGRAND JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 24,518 
TO THE PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR ATTORNEY, JOHN T. CAINE: 
Please take notice that Judgment was made and entered in 
favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiffs on June 16, 
1986. 
DATED this /» day of June, 1986. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
ADDENDUM B 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
DIANE PERRY, being duly sworn, states that she is employed 
in the office of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for 
Defendant
 a n d t h a t s h e s e r v ea a copy of 
Notice of Entry of Judgment 
upon the following parties: 
Mr. John T. Caine 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
2568 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
.by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope and mailing the 
same postage prepaid on,the 1 8 t h day of J u n e ^  , 1986. 
SECRETARY 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this »*thday of J u n e 
1986. f ./-» 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: Residing in the State of Utah 
TabC 
John T. Caine of 
RICHARDS, CAINE & RICHARDS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
2568 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 399-4191 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE and BEVERLY COTTLE, 
dba B & B PLAZA, INC., 
Plaint Iffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
LEGRAND JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION 
O0MPANY, INC., 
Defendant/Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN T. CAINE 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS 
Case No. 860402-
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WEBER 
Comes now, JOHN T. CAINE, and after being duly sworn upon 
his oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. That I am the attorney for the above named Plaintiffs. 
2. That your Affiant represented the Plaintiffs in the 
matters before tlie First Judicial District Court, concerning 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. 
3. That on June 5, 1986, your Affiant received from the 
Court, a copy of Judge, Chr i stof f erson f s Memorandum Decision 
granting Defendant's Motibn and directing Defendant's counsel to 
prepare the Order. 
4. On or about June 12, 1986, your Affiant received an 
1 
ADDENDUM C 
unsigned proposed Judgment, with a letter indicating that the 
same had been sent to Judge Chrlstofferson. 
5. That your Affiant has received no further correspondence 
from Defendant's attorney, Including the purported Notice of 
Entry of Judgment, which was allegedly sent on June 18, 1986. No 
such document was received by your Affiant, nor his office. 
6. That the first time your Affiant saw such Notice of 
Entry of Judgment was attached to Defendant's Motion. 
7. That your Affiant contacted the Clerk of the District 
Court in Cache County in late June to determine when the Judgment 
had been signed and was advised that "the Notice of Entry of 
Judgment was dated June 19, 1986". Your Affiant therefore, used 
this date for the f1 ling of Appeal. The 19th day of July, 1986, 
failing on a Saturday, the appeal was filed on Monday the 21st 
day of July, 1986 according to the Rules. 
8. At the time of the filing of the Appeal, the Clerk did 
not advised your Affiant that the date of the actual Entry of 
Judgment was different and your Affiant had no idea that the 
Judgment had actually been entered on the 16th day of June, until 
receiving Defendant's Motion. 
9. That upon receiving Defendant's Motion, your Affiant 
reviewed the record from Cache County and discovered the mistake. 
Apparently, the Clerk of the Court had advised your Affiant that 
Defendant's Notice of Judgment was there (which was in fact filed 
on June 19, 1986), instead of giving your Affiant the actual date 
of the docketing of the Judgment, on the 16th day of June, 1986. 
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10. Your Affiant believes that he acted In good faith and 
upon the information given him and In this particular incident, 
the Court, in its discretion should allow the filing of the 
Appeal. 
11. Further youry^ffiant sayeth not. 
DATED this fW jijy of August, lj 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /V2£day of August, 
1986. 
.^TARY PUBLfc yf\ 
Residing at: LydUc
 t ttf 
Commission Expires: ////<?£ 
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MASTER ANNOTATION VOLUME 179 
RAP-4 
within the prescribed time after the entry of the 
«&« \*9 V&* dtemcv. QQN3\ &Vspo&Y&% ^  \te. ?cv&\toct. 
Paragraph (c). This paragraph has no 
counterpart in prior Utah practice. It is, in 
substantial part, an adoption of Rule 4(aX2) 
FRAP. 
Paragraph (d). This paragraph changes the 
practice in Utah with regard to cross-appeals (see 
prior Rule 74(b) URCivP) and requires that a 
notice of the cross-appeal be filed within 14 days 
after the date of the first notice of appeal. The 
paragraph adopts substantially the time period and 
concept of cross-appeal in Rule 4(aX3) FRAP. 
Paragraph (e). This paragraph retains the prior 
practice under Rule 73(a) URCivP that the time for 
filing a notice of appeal may be extended by the 
district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect 
or good cause, if a motion for extension is filed not 
later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed in paragraphs (a) or (b). The application 
shall be on motion and may be ex parte (although 
ex parte practice is not encouraged) if filed prior to 
the expiration of the time for appeal. The district 
court may not grant an extension exceeding 30 days 
past the original time for appeal or 10 days from 
the date of entry of the order granting the motion, 
whichever occurs later. Excusable neglect or good 
cause under this paragraph refers generally to aa 
extraordinary circumstance that prevented the 
movant from filing a timely notice of appeal and 
not to inadvertence or oversight on the part of 
counsel or to the failure of the client to authorize 
an appeal. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE, 
RAP-4(a) 
Unless RP-2.9(b) has been complied with, the 
judgment in question is not deemed "filed" within 
the meaning of RCP-58A(c) and the time for 
taking an appeal from that judgment under old 
RCP-73(a) or new RAP-4(a) does not begin to run 
because the judgment has not been properly 
"entered/ 
CALFO v. D. C. STEWART CO., 717 P.2d 697, 
30 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, (03/28/86) 
RAP-4(b) 
A nouce of appeal filed before the disposition of 
a proper post-judgment motion Is ineffective to 
confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court. 
Finality of a judgment is suspended upon timely 
filing of a post-judgment motion under this rule, 
and the time for appeal does not commence until 
final disposition of that motion. 
TRANSAMERICA CASH RESERVE v. HAFEN, 
39 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, (08/05/86) 
Jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the 
Supreme Court by stipulation. Under old Rule 
73(a) a notice of appeal is ineffective if it is filed 
prior to a trial court's disposition of a post-
judgment motion under Rule 59(a)(6). The 
Supreme Court will not consider an appeal until 
the trial court has had an opportunity to review the 
order in question by ruling on the post-judgment 
motions. 
A filing of a nouce of appeal does not constitute 
an implied abandonment of Rule 59 motions. The 
abandonment of a motion for a new trial must be 
RAP-4<b) 
intentional. A stipulation of the parties for .a 
ce^tau£a& vuBddssL ?M!R. VKJi\ llkfiMosft doe* oat. 
imply an abandonment or withdrawl. 
BAILEY v. SOUND LAB, INC., 694 P M 1043, 
(12/21/84) 
RAP-5 
Where a decision of a circuit court doe* not. 
resolve the case as to all issues and all parties, 
review is available only under RCP-54(b). The 
discretionary review under RAP-5 is not available 
since that rule is specifically limited to application 
by tbe Supreme Court. 
MABUD v. PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL 
AIRLINES, 717 ?M 1350, 33 Utah Adv. Rtp, 6, 
(04/30/86) 
Where complaint alleged four causes of action, 
including lien foreclosure, breach of contract, 
failure to obtain bond, and quantum meriut, and 
where district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of certain defendants declaring them to have 
priority over the mechanic's lien, an appeal was 
premature. Although the summary judgment 
established the lenders' priority over the lien 
claimants' interests, the trial court had not 
determined issues pertaining to such things as the 
validity of the liens or the amounts secured by the 
liens. The appeal was therefore not from a final 
appealable order. 
The parties failed to avail themselves of the 
procedures of RCP-54(b). Neither was review of 
an interlocutory order granted under RCP-72(b) 
(now superseded by RAP-5). 
ALL WEATHER INSULATION v. AM1RON 
DEVELOPMENT CORP., 702 P.2d 1176, 13 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 53, (07/03/85) 
This Rule retains in Utah appellate practice (see 
prior Rule 72(b) URCivP) the authority of the 
Supreme Court to review on appeal interlocutory 
orders of the district court. Exercise of this power 
of review rests entirely within the discretion of the 
Court. The provisions of the Rule expand on pnor 
Rule 72(b). Because of the statutory certification 
procedure for interlocutory appeals in the federal 
system, the Rule does not necessarily have any 
relationship to Rule 5 FRAP. 
Paragraph (a). Under this paragraph, a petition 
for permission to appeal from an interlocutory 
order must be made within 20 days after the entry 
of the order (prior Rule 72(b) gave the petitioner 
one month). 
Paragraph (c). This paragraph spells out the 
CQotenu which a. oetiuoa Cot oexmicuaa to anqeal 
shall contain and requires that a copy of the 
interlocutory order, findings, conclusions and 
opinion of the district court be attached. Any party 
in opposition to or in concurrence with the petition 
has 10 days'to file an answer whereupon the 
petition shall be submitted without oral argument 
unless ordered by the Supreme Court. 
Paragraph (d). This paragraph sets forth the 
general standard for granting a petition for 
permission to appeal, viz., that it appears that the 
interlocutory order involves substantial rights 
materially affecting the final decision or that the 
determination of the correctness of the order 
before final judgment will better serve the interests 
of justice. The appeal may be granted on one or 
For all later ANNOTATIONS, see the most rteent issue of the Utah Advance Reports. 
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RAP-4 
within the prescribed time after the entry of the 
order by the district court disposing of the motion. 
Paragraph (c). This paragraph has no 
counterpart in prior Utah practice. It is, in 
substantial part, an adoption of Rule 4(a)(2) 
FRAP. 
Paragraph (d). This paragraph changes the 
practice in Utah with regard to cross-appeals (see 
prior Rule 74(b) URCivP) and requires that a 
notice of the cross-appeal be filed within 14 days 
after the date of the first notice of appeal. The 
paragraph adopts substantially the time period and 
concept of cross-appeal in Rule 4(a)(3) FRAP. 
Paragraph (e). This paragraph retains the prior 
practice under Rule 73(a) URCivP that the time for 
filing a notice of appeal may be extended by the 
district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect 
or good cause, if a motion for extension is filed not I 
later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 1 
prescribed in paragraphs (a) or (b). The application 
shall be on motion and may be ex parte (although 
ex parte practice is not encouraged) if filed prior to 
the expiration of the time for appeal. The district 
court may not grant an extension exceeding 30 days 
past the original time for appeal or 10 days from 
the date of entry of the order granting the motion, 
whichever occurs later. Excusable neglect or good 
cause under this paragraph refers generally to an 
extraordinary circumstance that prevented the 
movant from filing a timely notice of appeal and 
not to inadvertence or oversight on the part of 
counsel or to the failure of the client to authorize 
an appeal. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE, 
RAP-4(a) 
Unless RP-2.9(b) has been complied with, the 
judgment in question is not deemed "filed" within 
the meaning of RCP-58A(c) and the time for 
taking an appeal from that judgment under old 
RCP-73(a) or new RAP-4(a) does not begin to run 
because the judgment has not been properly 
'entered." 
CALFO v. D. C. STEWART CO., 717 P.2d 697, 
30 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, (03/28/86) 
RAP-4(b) 
A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of 
a proper post-judgment motion Is ineffective to 
confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court. 
Finality of a judgment is suspended upon timely 
filing of a post-judgment motion under this rule, 
and the time for appeal does not commence until 
final disposition of that motion. 
TRANSAMERICA CASH RESERVE v. HAFEN, 
39 Utah Adv. Rep. 33, (08/05/86) 
Jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the 
Supreme Court by stipulation. Under old Rule 
73(a) a notice of appeal is ineffective if it is filed 
prior to a trial court's disposition of a post-
judgment motion under Rule 59(a)(6). The 
Supreme Court will not consider an appeal until 
the trial court has had an opportunity to review the 
order in question by ruling on the post-judgment 
motions. 
A filing of a notice of appeal does not constitute 
an implied abandonment of Rule 59 motions. The 
abandonment of a motion for a new trial must be 
RAP-4(b) 
intentional. A stipulation of the parties for a 
certification under Rule 54(b) likewise does not 
imply an abandonment or withdraw]. 
BAILEY v. SOUND LAB, INC., 694 P*2d 1043, 
(12/21/84) 
RAP-5 
Where a decision of a circuit court does not 
resolve the case as to all issues and all parties, 
review is available only under RCP-54(b). The 
discretionary review under RAP-5 is not available 
since that rule is specifically limited to application 
by the Supreme Court. 
MABUD v. PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL 
AIRLINES, 717 P.2d 1350, 33 Utah Adv. Rtp, $, 
(04/30/86) 
Where complaint alleged four causes of action, 
including lien foreclosure, breach of contract, 
failure to obtain bond, and quantum meriut, and 
where district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of certain defendants declaring them to have 
priority over the mechanic's lien, an appeal was 
premature. Although the summary judgment 
established the lenders' priority over the lien 
claimants' interests, the trial court had not 
determined issues pertaining to such things as the 
validity of the liens or the amounts secured by the 
liens. The appeal was therefore not from a final 
appealable order. 
The parties failed to avail themselves of the 
procedures of RCP-54(b). Neither was review of 
an interlocutory order granted under RCP-72(b) 
(now superseded by RAP-5). 
ALL WEATHER INSULATION v. AMIRON 
DEVELOPMENT CORP., 702 P.2d 1176, 13 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 53, (07/03/85) 
This Rule retains in Utah appellate practice (see 
prior Rule 72(b) URCivP) the authority of the 
Supreme Court to review on appeal interlocutory 
orders of the district court. Exercise of this power 
of review rests entirely within the discretion of the 
Court. The provisions of the Rule expand on prior 
Rule 72(b). Because of the statutory certification 
procedure for interlocutory appeals in the federal 
system, the Rule does not necessarily have any 
relationship to Rule 5 FRAP. 
Paragraph (a). Under this paragraph, a petition 
for permission to appeal from an interlocutory 
order must be made within 20 days after the entry 
of the order (prior Rule 72(b) gave the petitioner 
one month). 
Paragraph (c). This paragraph spells out the 
contents which a petition for permission to appeal 
shall contain and requires that a copy of the 
interlocutory order, findings, conclusions and 
opinion of the district court be attached. Any party 
in opposition to or in concurrence with the petition 
has 10 days'to file an answer whereupon the 
petition shall be submitted without oral argument 
unless ordered by the Supreme Court. 
Paragraph (d). This paragraph sets forth the 
general standard for granting a petition for 
permission to appeal, viz., that it appears that the 
interlocutory order involves substantial rights 
materially affecting the final decision or that the 
determination of the correctness of the order 
before final judgment will better serve the interests 
of justice. The appeal may be granted on one or 
For all later ANNOTATIONS, see the most recent issue of the Utah Advance Reports. 
